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1. Introduction  
By any measure, the European Monetary Union and the European Union are in a deep hole. In 
the summer of 2011 we came uncomfortably close to an uncontrolled sovereign default of an 
EU country, a member of the European Monetary Union, hardly ten years after the common 
currency project was launched. In the months that followed, Greece was brought back from 
the precipice, but by the time of this writing has accumulated sovereign indebtedness of more 
than €380b or more than 170% of the country’s gross domestic product. By current estimates, 
more than half of this debt is held by foreigners, and mostly by foreign official institutions. 
How could a country with less than 2% of EU output be the source of such great 
concern? Quite simply, because in the meantime Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Italy (which 
along with Greece, are known as the GIIPs countries, or the PIIGS in less politically correct 
circles) have all spent significant time at the financial edge, with borrowing costs rising 
enough to threaten the integrity of the Eurozone banking system, the mechanism of payments, 
the European Central Bank and the common currency itself. In my view, we are still not out 
of the hole, even though most recent events may belie that assessment.2  
My job as a macroeconomist is to provide the bird’s eye view of what has happened in 
the past three years – and perhaps more importantly what did not happen over the past thirteen 
years – which has led us to where we are today. The central question to address is how a 
sovereign debt crisis was the product of a less-than-optimally planned European Monetary 
Union, and how the sovereign debt crisis of a nation or nations can credibly threaten the 
existence of the entire monetary edifice that Europe built. While it is important to lay blame 
and name names, it is more important to ask where the systemic failures of macroeconomic 
policy and polity at the trans-European level could have occurred, in order to have any chance 
                                                 
2 The Humboldt conference was held on 13 January 2012. In the meantime, ECB President 
Mario Draghi has made a series of dramatic verbal commitments to do whatever necessary 
(summer of 2012) followed by a formal mechanism (September 2012) even though there has 




of preventing a similar episode in the future. In this essay I would like to give a brief 
overview of how we got here. Given that, how will we get out? In concluding, I offer three 
scenarios, which in turn offer insight into the limited degree of freedom still available to 
policymakers, without taking a stand on which scenario will actually become reality.  
 
2. The deep hole we’re in – how did we get there?  
In 1995 the ratio of sovereign government debt to GDP in Greece was 97%, which is slightly 
below the level of US government indebtedness today.  Since the great recession, the ratio of 
government debt to GDP has risen dramatically in all OECD countries, and especially in the 
GIIPs countries, as a result of fiscal stimulus legislation, falling tax revenues and financial 
market bailouts. Figure 1 shows that government debt levels are not only high everywhere 
relative to GDP but they have risen precipitously since 2006.  The severity of the Great 
Recession has undoubtedly been responsible for this development, yet it is interesting that 
some highly indebted countries (Japan, UK, US) have retained high credit ratings, while even 
the most reputable of European sovereigns struggle with the consequences of drastic 
downgrades.  
<Figure 1 about here> 
 Sovereign debt has existed for centuries. Governments of countries like Ireland, 
Belgium, Greece, and Italy have or have had large levels of sovereign debt - were able to 
borrow large fractions of GDP in normal times until 2007.  Yet countries have also defaulted 
spectacularly – Greece five times since its founding in 1826; Russia, China and Cuba after 
their revolutions. Yet the existence of sovereign debt proves the point: international lenders 
are willing to take a bet that a country will make good on an unsecured and unconditionally 
promised income stream which is backed not by productive activity directly, but rather the 
state’s ability to extract resources from its economy. This is a bet, not only regarding the 




borrowing economy will continue to grow sustainably into the indefinite future. Holding tax 
rates and the willingness to pay constant, economic growth implies growing tax revenues. It is 
fair to say that this bet is not unreasonable: Estimates of aggregate macroeconomic activity in 
countries which comprise the current OECD have grown robustly since the early 1820s at 
about 1.8-2% per annum despite wars, panics, and natural disasters (Maddison (1995)).3  
 Furthermore, it is in the nature of international lending that the more important 
determinant of the willingness to lend internationally is the willingness of borrowers to 
commit “original sin”, i.e. to borrow in a foreign currency (Eichengreen, Hausmann and 
Panizza (2005)), and thereby to preclude out macroeconomic crimes of surprise inflation and 
currency debasement. With very few exceptions (the US, the United Kingdom, Japan,…), 
sovereign borrowers have original sin on their hands. The Eurozone sovereigns are really no 
exception. For Greece or Portugal to issue sovereign debt in Euros is to issue debt in a foreign 
currency, over which the national authorities have no power. Yet financial markets were 
willing to take this risk with a vengeance. The first panel of Figure 2 shows that during the 
“Golden Age” of European monetary union (2002-2007), ten-year yields on government debt 
in the Euro area converged to within only a few basis points of the most credible borrower-
state, Germany. This convergence of interest rates was celebrated by then-ECB President 
Jean-Claude Trichet – somewhat naïvely, it turns out – as proof that the monetary union had 
ushered in a new age of monetary and financial integration.  
<Figure 2 about here> 
 All this changed with the global financial crisis (2008-9), and the Great Recession 
which followed. Although it clearly originated in the US, it sent shockwaves across the world. 
In particular, it burst real estate bubbles in Ireland and Spain and deflated tax revenues in 
Greece, Italy and Portugal as well as more solid economies.  In Ireland and Spain, collapsing 
                                                 
3 It is well-known that a number countries, such as Argentina, were internationally visible and 




real estate prices threatened the solvency of mortgage lender banks as well as the arrangers of 
wholesale lines of finance, which ultimately implicated financial institutions in Germany and 
France and elsewhere in Europe. For better or for worse, banks were bailed out at taxpayer 
expense, ballooning government deficits. Then the financial markets suddenly discovered that 
the emperor had no clothes, as I will outline below.  
 Yet this cannot be the whole story, and it is not. Selectively but decisively, international 
lenders came to the conclusion that European governments could no longer cover deficits by 
borrowing at the same interest rates they had faced in previous years. Financial markets lost 
their trust in the Leviathan’s ability to repay. The deeper crisis in Europe, especially in 
southern Europe, was a perceived inability to grow and integrate itself in the world trading 
system to the extent that the northern neighbors had. This failure to adapt to the greater 
problem, in contrast to Germany, with Austria, Finland, and the Netherlands, must also be 
addressed.  
 From the macroeconomic perspective, there are two interpretations of the crisis.  The 
fundamental interpretation of the crisis was that the GIIPS countries were fundamentally 
insolvent, or on an easily identified path towards insolvency, to begin with. Nonfundamental 
interpretations are more subtle: the collapse of sovereign bond prices and implied rise in 
government borrowing rates were the central event that made them insolvent. These accounts 
are by no means mutually exclusive – and are most likely to reinforce each other. But they do 
put emphasis on different players. 
    Let us begin with the fundamental viewpont. In this narrative, the GIIPS countries 
squandered their chance to profit from low interest rates following monetary union (see 
Figure 2), modernize their economies and improve their competitiveness. Instead they went 
on a consumption binge up until 2006. The second panel of Figure 2 lends some credence to 
this explanation. The deterioration of competitiveness – meaning specifically a country’s 




significantly in the years following the introduction of the Euro. In an article which appeared 
on February 19, 2006, the German daily newspaper Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung reported 
cumulative increases of unit labor cost deterioration of the GIIPS countries relative to 
Germany of 20% and more – more than three years before the Euro sovereign crisis erupted. 
On top of this, the southern European periphery was running large and growing current 
account deficits, a sign that something was not working properly. If the countries had used the 
opportunity to modernize their capital stock or infrastructure investment, there would have 
been payback in terms of more competitive exports. As the second panel of Figure 2 shows, 
the fraction of GDP dedicated to consumption rose significantly in all the southern countries, 
in comparison to Germany, which was stable.4  
 The surge in domestic consumption in the GIIPS countries led to a dramatic increase in 
the price of nontradable goods over the same period, which in turn fed into workers pay 
demands and diminished national competitiveness. Figure 3 displays the cumulative change in 
relative prices over the period 2000-2008. Recall that in a monetary union, nominal exchange 
rate changes between members are no longer possible, so within-Eurozone trade is determined 
by relative price levels only. As countries lose competitiveness their ability to service external 
debt with export revenues deteriorates while their dependence on imports grows.  The total 
height of each country’s bar in the figure measures the cumulative change in relative price 
competitiveness vis-à-vis the Eurozone average. Clearly, the secular deterioration of southern 
Europe and Ireland’s competitiveness derives from a marked rise in the relative price of 
nontraded goods (apartment rents, restaurants and other consumer services, transport). This 
deterioration leads to higher wage demands and higher unit labor costs (as documented by the 
Frankfurter Allgemeine already in 2007 and now widely recognized). Combined with the 
general deterioration in the current account balances, we have prima facie evidence that the 
                                                 
4 In the period 2000-2007 the absolute level of real consumption expenditures increased by 
33% in Greece,  12% in Portugal, 28% in Spain, 41% in Ireland and 6% in Italy – compared 




problem lies in a long-standing lack of price competitiveness. The logical way to restore 
current account balance is for relative prices in the southern periphery and Ireland to decline 
relative to Germany and northern Europe in general, and for this to happen for an extended 
period of time.  
<Figure 3 about here> 
          At the same time, a nonfundamental account of the crisis also contains serious merit, 
even if can always be exploited as a self-serving defense of delinquent debtors. Solvency of a 
sovereign government is an inherently loose concept, depending not only on competitiveness 
but also on the ability and willingness of governments to raise revenue from the real 
economy. Crucially, it also depends on the rate of interest. Even an AAA borrower like 
Germany would be bankrupt if it had to borrow at current GIIPS interest rates. Consider the 
following convenient formula which states the primary surplus (PSurp) necessary to keep the 
ratio of debt (D) to GDP (Y) constant for a given rate of future real economic growth (g) and 
real interest rate to be paid on the debt (r):5   




PSurp )(   
This formula often comes as a surprise to non-economists: in order to keep D/Y constant, it is 
not necessary to run a large budget surplus or even any surplus at all, as long as the 
denominator (Y) is growing at a rate g which is sufficiently high relative to that of the 
numerator (D) - the rate of interest r.  
          In normal times the interest rate exceeds the growth rate of the economy, so it is 
customary for the IMF to shoot for a primary surplus when prescribing an adjustment 
program. Yet the markets, and not governments or the IMF, determine the interest rate r at 
which lenders lend to countries.  For precisely this reason, a debt-GDP ratio of 97% at the 
                                                 
5 The primary surplus is the overall financing surplus less interes income – put differenently, 
the primary deficit equals the government borrowing requirement less interest payments. See, 




beginning of the Euro-Odyssey 2001 seemed sustainable at the time for Greece, if one were 
willing to assume that growth would remain high relative to the borrowing rate.6  A 
nonfundamental perspective would emphasize that a pessimistic turn of market expectations 
of Greece’s creditworthiness or inability to grow induced a sharp increase in interest rates that 
itself moved that country into a state of insolvency. Both the interest rate and the rate of 
economic growth play central roles.  
          So what happened in Greece in 2009? It all started after a legendary run-in with the 
leading global sovereign bond fund manager Pimco –which manages more than $1.3 trillion 
in assets for insurance companies and pension funds, among others. After Greece’s public 
concession in late fall of 2009 that its fiscal deficit had reached 14% of GDP - twice the 
original estimates – Pimco allegedly demanded an explanation from the Greek finance 
ministry, which gave a very evasive and uninformative answer. Unsatisfied, simply dumped 
its entire Greek sovereign portfolio, which was followed by a roughly 100 basis point rise in 
its 10 year bond yields over the month of December 2009. Pimco did not stop there: they also 
sold off their Portuguese and Spanish sovereign debt, initiating a rapid unraveling of the tight 
cross-country bond yield structure that had prevailed for more than seven years (see Figure 
2).7  The event underscores the “no-nonsense” approach of Anglo-US finance, pointing out 
that “the Emperor has no clothes,” a fact which the Europeans and financial markets had 
managed to repress for years. 
 
 
                                                 
6 In five years prior to 2001, the Greek economy grew at 3.2% per annum and the five-year 
yield on debt in 2002 was roughly 5%. Assuming (perhaps naïvely) a growth rate of 3.2% per 
annum and a 100% debt-to-GDP ratio, the formula in the text would require a primary 
government surplus of 1.8% of GDP to stabilize the debt-GDP ratio constant. In 2001, 
Greece’s primary government surplus was 1.5% of GDP, and averaged 3.1% in the years 
1996-2000! Upon joining the Eurozone in 2002, however, Greece’s fiscal discipline weakend 
considerably; in the years 2002-2007, the primary surplus averaged -0.9%  (a deficit), 
reaching -2.8% in 2004.  
7 http://www.thisamericanlife.org/radio-archives/episode/455/continental-breakup?act=3 




4. Who’s to blame?  
          The Euro crisis is about a massive collective failure. It is important for commentators 
not to mince words in this forum, and I won’t. But having thought about it for several years 
now, I conclude that playing the blame game is a useless exercise. My conclusion is that all 
parties were to blame, not only for their actions but for their implicit complicity that goes with 
not criticizing the state of affairs, but by putting on horse-blinders and muddling through. 
 
Political elites of Europe, starting with Kohl and Mitterand and proceding through Schröder 
and Chirac and Barroso, Monti and Trichet, blithely ignored the momentous implications of 
financial integration for financial stability. The policy of “benign neglect” of ignoring or even 
sanctioning Greek and Italy’s fraudulent entry into the Euro didn’t help matters. When 
confronted with these accusations, they turn and blame… 
 
...the GIIPS countries for failing to profit from Euro membership after 2000 to build a solid 
foundation for economic growth. Figure 2 shows the extent to which sovereign borrowing 
rates converged during the “golden era” of monetary union 2000-2007. In the second panel, 
Figure 2 plots consumption as a fraction of GDP in these same countries over the same 
period. When confronted with these numbers, the ruling elites in the southern periphery and 
Ireland are quite adept at blaming the lenders, so we could turn our attention to… 
 
…French and German financial institutions, and investment banks in particular, who 
participated in the party without questioning the assumptions behind the business model. In 
banking, it alwas takes two to tango. Sovereign lending is inherently unsecured. There is no 
easy recourse to recovery as in the case of national private lending, and if there is, it is a 
costly road with much uncertainty.8 Lenders in Germany and France were cognizant of this 
                                                 
8 One thing is certain: since becoming an independent state in 1829, Greece has defaulted on 




fact. Many loans financed by banks to sovereigns involved the finance of big ticket industrial 
or military items (e.g. French jets and radar defense systems, German submarines and tanks) 
after either being encouraged by their respective governments or actually being directed to do 
so (i.e. Germany’s Landesbank problem). Investment banks like Goldman Sachs, are known 
to have even constructed financial deals which enabled Italy and Greece to squeak past the 
Maastricht criteria or to “show significant progress towards achieving those targets”. When 
confronted with these accusations, the banks duck and cover behind the fig leaf of the rating 
agencies, which are a natural target, so looking in that direction, we find that… 
 
…Ratings agencies present the greatest challenge to the blame game. One doesn’t need to be 
a rocket scientist to see that these central institutions entrusted with the objective assessment 
of sovereign lending risks were either embarrassingly ignorant or collectively corrupt. Neither 
prospect sheds a positive light on their activity. How could they have been so naïve to give 
Greece an A borrowing rating up until December 2009, and only after the dogs of finance had 
been awakened by a private sovereign bond fund (Pimco)? Rudimentary macroeconomics 
tells us that real shocks and fiscal adjustment have stronger effects under fixed exchange rates 
(Mundell 1962, Fleming 1962, Burda and Wyplosz 2012) and rating agencies should have 
taken the eventuality of disruptive fiscal stabilizations into account. Banks trusted blindly the 
quality of government debt and the quality of the rating agencies, so overly optimistic ratings, 
such as those given to Greek sovereign debt in 2001 or to Irish banks until 2007, led to 
excessive bank holdings of these securities and increasing vulnerability to contagion.9  When 
confronted with this accusation, the rating agencies blame the politicians….  
                                                                                                                                                        
union including France, Spain, Belgium, Italy and Switzerland. Greece ultimately left the 
Latin Monetary Union in 1908.  
9 Moody’s clung to its A rating for Greece government debt until 2010, after the yields on its 
debt began climbing in December 2009. See „Ratings Firms Misread Signs of Greek Woes”, 
New York Times November 29, 2011. Similarly, only after the December 2009 sell-off did 
Fitch reduce its own rating of Greek sovereign debt from A- to BBB+ and downgrade Greece 





 So we are back to square one, the political elites. If they are indeed at fault in the eyes 
of the ratings agencies, then the blame game has become a transitive and infinite loop! In the 
case of Greece, Portugal and Italy, budgetary problems led to sovereign debt crises, which in 
turn threatened the viability of banks which had loaded up on supposedly riskless government 
debt, which in turn led to government bailouts which led to even more dramatic budgetary 
shortfalls. In Ireland and Spain, it was an obvious real estate orgy which led to an orgy of 
inadequately collateralized bank lending, which led to massive losses and a collapse of 
interbank lending. Governments stepped in, in the case of Ireland irrationally so, and 
guaranteed all liabilities, leading to dramatic quantum increases in government debt. 
 If everyone is to blame, then all parties are collectively responsible. Yet if all are 
responsible, no one will ever take responsibility. One might call it a case of systemic moral 
hazard. Few parties to this disaster raised their voices, either because they didn’t have the 
courage to do so, or for fear of raining on the parade or losing out on a chance for lucrative 
profits.10 Neither the Eurocracy nor the plutocracy bothered to ask whether the breathtaking 
pace of financial integration didn’t already imply a mutual European liability for government 
debt, due to “too big to fail”? Implicitly, the taxpayers of debtor countries were saddled with 
the liability without ever being asked! The real travesty of democracy as opposed that cited by 
globalization opponents should be: Why were these sovereigns allowed to borrow in the first 
place?  
 
5. How will we get out of the hole? Possible Scenarios  
 
The usual prescriptions from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the European 
Commission and the ECB are well known, and all unappetizing. The classic IMF formula, 
                                                 
10 The Financial Times quoted ex-CEO of Citibank, Charles “Chuck” Prince, on July 10 2007 
– as the financial crisis was erupting – as saying “When the music stops, in terms of liquidity, 
things will be complicated. But as long as the music is playing, you’ve got to get up and 




rigorously applied in the GIIPS countries, is budgetary austerity. Applying the budgetary 
knife means cutting the deficit directly by raising tax rates, expanding the tax base, closing 
loopholes as well as cutting spending on goods and services as well as transfers to 
households. While these measures usually appease the creditors, they do little to create a 
future basis of economic growth besides creating excess capacity. In unresponsive, state-
dominated economies such as Greece’s, the option of selling some of the family jewels is 
more attractive, especially if one believes that the government running large enterprises is a 
source of and not solution to the economy’s problems– provided the proceeds are used to 
retire existing debt. Even more attractive – were the government capable of organizing it – 
would be a debt-equity swap of assets directly for debt, possibly at advantageous terms.   
And then there are the bailouts. The simplest form of bailout is predicated on a 
judgment that the country is fundamentally solvent – in the sense that it could, politically as 
well as economically, muster the resources in present value terms at an “acceptable interest 
rate”. This judgment is notoriously vague, since the interest rates are the collective judgment 
of the market. In the end, we are making a judgment about the “fundamentalness” or “non-
fundamentalness” of the interest rate at which lenders, especially foreigners, should advance 
resources to the sovereign. For purely political reasons, it may be deemed appropriate to 
refinance these countries at low and subsidized interest rates.  
At some level, private sector involvement (PSI) is demanded and at some point the 
solution under such conditions is labeled by creditors as coercion and may represent 
technically a default. Such are the haircuts that are often under discussion. Such controlled 
forms of bankruptcy or reorganization are certainly to be preferred to „uncontrolled 
bankruptcy” triggered by an ECB liquidity cutoff and the introduction of scrip. This ad-hoc 
national would rapidly become a new currency and undergo a sharp depreciation. This new 
currency would be accompanied by a dramatic depreciation vis-à-vis the Eurozone, leading to 




Yet these are simply short-term fixes – fixes for the owners of banks, claims on 
wobbly financial institutions, or high-yielding government debt. These are largely wealthy 
individuals. The only truly robust solution which benefits all involves re-establishing a  
sustainable basis for growth in the medium run. Greece’s problems are primarily supply side 
problems, and cannot be solved by a demand stimulus. This remains true despite the paradox 
that current austerity measures have dampened growth in the short run. The Greek tragedy is 
that supply side policies require an investment of time and patience of 3-5 years or even 
longer, time that the Greeks may not have.  Furthermore these reforms must be credible; mere 
announcements without any follow-through erode the credibility of every announcement 
which follows.  
All the caveats notwithstanding, the case for good supply side policies – clever market 
oriented labor and product market reforms – is validated by the experience of the Netherlands 
after 1982, Denmark after 1990, Germany after 2004 not to mention Ireland after 1988-2000, 
when GDP per capita rose from 80% in 1990 to 144% of France’s level in 2005, before the 
banks took over and ruined the party. While these policies are more difficult to implement 
politically, they are also the ones that will be noticed a decade later. They leave a sustainable 
footprint on the trajectory of GDP per capita in the long run, the basis for long-run increases 
in standards of living. 
Supply side reforms are politically complicated, and are easily blocked. Product 
market reforms, labor market reforms, the establishment and consistent application of rule of 
law, the banishment of corruption, increasing competition in all walks of economic life – all 
measures which tend to make it easier for new entrants to engage in economic activity and 
expand the current set of economic alternatives. These measures also destroy rents in 
protected, regulated sectors which may have taken decades to accumulate. Current debates 




transport sector in Greece are two particularly salient examples, but there are many, many 
more. As is frequently the case, the devil’s in the detail.  
Good supply-side policies are difficult to implement precisely because their benefits 
come so late in the game and their initiators can hardly reap any political advantage from 
them. It is notoriously hard to document these things much less quantify them with numbers. 
Yet those attempts to construct indexes of the business climate and freedom from arbitrary 
regulation, taxation, and obstruction of market access.  The data tell us unequivocally that the 
south of Europe, and Greece in particular, still has have far to go. The renowned “Doing 
Business Index” constructed by the World Bank (www.doingbusiness.org, see Djankov et al 
2002) measures the assessment of lawyers, business consultants, accountants and other 
experts on the business climate in more in roughly 190 countries.  In 2010, Greece occupied 
109th place, just behind Bangladesh, Paraguay, Yemen and Ethiopia. (Italy, Spain, Portugal 
and Ireland ranked 80th, 49th, 31st and 9th respectively). These results are validated by other 
benchmark assessments such as the World Competitiveness, Freedom from Corruption and 
Business Freedom indexes. It should be noted that in the past years Greece has improved 
many of its rankings – but the most important subcomponent of that index – the ease of 
starting a business – remains in the lower half of the 185 countries surveyed, improving from 
149th in 2010 to only 146th in 2013!) There is much to be done in this regard.  
 
 With all this in mind, let me sketch three scenarios: the Good, the Bad and the Ugly.  
 
The Good  
 In the Good Scenario, Greece ultimately accepts the “tough love” reform program of 
the Troika (EU/IMF/ECB) to restore investor confidence - with a great deal of national 
reluctance but with a good measure of resolve. Because the Troika’s policy is pursued with 




further support for infrastructure investment. The Greek government reforms are followed by 
privatization, the proceeds of which are used to retire debt (at an effective exchange rate 
favorable for the Greeks), ratings improve and bond yields fall again. Greece stays in the Euro 
area and restores fiscal responsibility. In seven years, Greece has access to credit markets 
once again. 
 In my Good Scenario I also see a de-politicization of both banking and credit 
allocation. This will require bold steps – one of which is the abolition of the national central 
banks and the creation of geographically and economically comparably efficient “banking 
districts” as was done when the US Federal Reserve Bank was created in 1913.11 This would 
eliminate the currently national-oriented (and sometimes nationalistic) discussion of the 
natural balance of payment imbalances which arise at a regional level in a monetary union and 
the way they are dealt with.  
The Bad  
 In the Bad Scenario, the Troika’s program leads to significant resistance in the 
population, as soon as the reforms on paper are actually implemented. The political 
consequences of the program raise domestic anger and resentment of the Euro and the EU, 
especially the European Commission, which is seen as the extended hand of German and 
French creditors. Financial markets continue to short Greek debt, interest rates rise, budgetary 
problems mount. The Greek government collapses, politicians all over Europe blame the ECB 
for not bailing out the country yet again. Greece exits the Euro, reintroduces the drachma. By 
2018 – and after considerable social and political chaos – the sharp gains in competitiveness 
in Greece become the object of envy in the other countries of the southern periphery. Other 
countries are tempted to follow. Financial markets sense this envy and temptation and short-
                                                 
11 For an articulation of this position, see Burda (2012). For a discussion of how the United 




sell sovereign debt with a vengeance, leading to a self-fulfilling dissolution of the southern 
Euro periphery.   
The Ugly  
 The Ugly Scenario is a classic case of “Weiterwurschteln à la Européenne” - 
muddling through as Europe has always done in the past when confronted with challenges.  In 
this scenario, the Troika imposes an IMF-style program on Greece to restore investor 
confidence. The Greeks (and the rest of Southern Europe) promise much but deliver little. 
Because foreign investors understand this, crucial foreign direct investment does not 
materialize. In 2015 the result is no growth, and more demands for more relief.  The political 
consequences of chronic transfers to the south raise domestic anger and resentment of EU and 
the Euro. Financial markets continue to short GIPS debt, interest rates rise, budgetary 
problems mount.  The ECB continuing funding of zombie southern European banks has 
political repercussions in Germany and other northern countries. This time it is the Germans 
and other northern Europeans who recoil at the prospect of a permanent bailout of sovereign 
countries, while interest rates for savers remain persistently below the rate of inflation – 
which is creeping upwards at the same time. The political profitability of an “anti-Euro” party 
is too great and the party not only weakens the major parties but also shifts their European 
orientation. Rising inflation in the Eurozone leads to a galvanized political movement in 
Germany for the exit from the Euro by these countries.  The result is a NEURO – or 
“Nordeuro” – which appreciates sharply, devastating the progress made towards real 
economic integration in Europe and setting us back in the way the Great Depression did in the 
1930s.   
 
6. Conclusion  
I am fond of telling my students that the European monetary union is like a rooming 




same as family, and there is a certain amount of private space that each person has a right to – 
a private room, a corner of the pantry or medicine cabinet, and if there is little trust, an 
individualized locker or cabinet kept under lock and key. Necessarily there are shared 
common areas which are essential to leading a normal individual lifestyle - kitchen, living 
room, WC, etc. Sustainable use of common areas implies that each member of the rooming 
group has an obligation to clean up afterwards, which can often lead to tensions. There is 
always – almost by construction– someone who does more of the work keeping the apartment 
clean and others are slackers. All rooming arrangements are characterized by conflicts, and 
often fights arise over matters which seem trivial, when considered with some emotional 
distance. Yet the longer people room together, the harder it is to separate. Sometimes rooming 
groups can last years or decades, and when they break up, it is usually under less than friendly 
terms.12 
The metaphor can be developed even further. All members of a Wohngemeinschaft 
have an interest in the health of each and every individual. We all benefit if everyone washes 
his hands, bathes regularly and keeps a clean and tidy room. For this reason, Europe – and not 
just the Eurozone – needs to rethink the structure of the European house and how its residents 
can maintain a modicum of economic hygiene. The title of my essay asks “How can we get 
out of it” – the answer is only with a lot of serious housecleaning and soul-searching. 
Questions of governance, fiscal responsibility and insolvency resolution – central questions 
posed at this conference – can be thought of as good housekeeping rules that need to be 
agreed upon before friends and acquaintances move together and become housemates.  Some 
of the most important issues on Europe’s table at the moment need to be decided in the same 
way: A banking union equipped with real power and authority to act swiftly, decisively, and 
                                                 
12 Somewhat controversially, the US economist Martin Feldstein (1997) concluded that 
inappropriate monetary unions are the source of political instability, civil unrest, and even 
war.  Fifteen years later, he confirmed his pessimistic assessment of the long-term prospects 




perhaps less than democratically; a fiscal union of some sort which at least defines what the 
European union cannot do in support of its weakest members; the establishment of an 
enforceable country insolvency regime as well as a credible fiscal stability pact. Doing all this 
correctly from the outset is an essential element for keeping the European rooming group 
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Figure 1: Debt-GDP ratios, 1990-2012 
 
a)  Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain  
 




Figure 2: Sovereign debt yields 10 year maturity and consumption-GDP shares, 
1994-2012 
a) Yields on 10 year government bonds  
 
 










 Figure 3: Unit labor costs, cumulative change by sector 1999-2008  
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